Just adding a reference.

There might be some test cases not covered yet. That will be done
later.

NOKEYCHECK=True
PiperOrigin-RevId: 232472199
GitOrigin-RevId: 8821bbd10f7917f161b83e26edc19a213d67c8c0

doc/bib.md

@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ D. A. McGrew and J. Viega,
 "The Galois/Counter Mode of operation (GCM).",
 http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/modes/proposedmodes/gcm/gcm-spec.pdf.
 
+### AbVaLo19 {#AbVaLo19}
+R. Abarzúa, C. Valencia and J. López,
+"Survey for Performance & Security Problems of Passive Side-channel Attacks Countermeasures in ECC",
+https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/010.pdf
+
 ### ABMSV03 {#ABMSV03}
 A. Antipa, D. Brown, A. Menezes, R. Struik, S. Vanstone,
 "Validation of Elliptic Curve Public Keys",

doc/ecdh.md

@@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ an attack is possible. The attack has been extended by Akishita and Takagi
 multiplication have similar properties and hence that additional attacks are
 possible. The golang library was susceptible to this attack, since doubling a
 point with x-coordinate 1 typically resulted in an virtually endless loop
-[[CVE-2019-6486]](bib.md#CVE-2019-6486).
+[[CVE-2019-6486]](bib.md#CVE-2019-6486). A recent survey about timing and side
+channel attaks is [[AbVaLo19]](bib.md#AbVaLo19)).
 
 ## Side channel attacks that are not detectable by Wycheproof